How Lobengula Was Tricked Into Signing Treaty

Rhodes had already tried and failed to get a mining concession from Lobengula, king of the Ndebele, when in 1888 he sent John Moffat (son of the missionary Robert Moffat), who was trusted by Lobengula, to persuade the latter to sign a treaty of friendship with Britain, and to look favourably on Rhodes’ proposals.

Baxter:

No record exists of exactly how Moffat approached the matter of a treaty with the British, but it can be safely assumed that he used the fear latent in the amaNdebele that a renewed invasion of Matabeleland by the Boer would be imminent if Lobengula did not place himself under the protection of Her Majesty. This had lately been a decision made by Lobengula’s neighbour, Chief Khama of Bechuanaland, who now enjoyed the safety of knowing that he could rely on the forces of Her Majesty to protect him against the advances of either the Boers, the Germans or the amaPutukezi (Portuguese). 

By February 1888 Moffat had convinced Lobengula to commit his mark to a document outlining the principals agreed between these two men. The document itself, copied below, was an innocuous document, offering little and requiring little, other than that the amaNdebele make no firm commitments to any other nation or authority without the prior agreement of Her Majesty. Bearing in mind that this was not an official document, and that Moffat did not speak for the Crown, any specific offer of protection was fraudulent. All that it truly meant was that Cecil Rhodes had managed to second the assistance of three Crown servants acting outside of their authority, and had secured for his future interests and option on Matabeleland.

The text of the Moffat’s ‘treaty of friendship’:

The Chief Lobengula, ruler of the tribe known as Amandebele, together with the Mashona and Makalaka tributaries of the same, hereby agrees to the following articles and conditions… 

That peace and amity will continue forever between Her Britannic Majesty, her subjects and the Amandebele people; and the contracting Chief, Lobengula, engages to use his utmost endeavours to prevent any rupture of the same, to cause the strict observance of this treaty, and so to carry out the treaty of friendship which was entered into by his late father, the Chief Umsiligaas, with the Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, in the year of our Lord 1888. 

It is hereby further agreed by Lobengula, Chief in and over the Amandebele country, with the dependencies as aforesaid, on behalf of himself and people, that he will refrain from entering into any correspondence or treaty with any foreign state or power to sell, alienate or cede or permit or countenance any sale, alienation or cession of the whole or any part of the said Amandebele country under his chieftainship, or upon any other subject without the previous knowledge and sanction of Her Majesties High Commissioner for South Africa. 

In faith of which I, Lobengula, on my part have hereto set my hands at Gubulawayo, Amandabeleland, this eleventh day of February, and of Her Majesties reign the 51st. 

Lobengula: His Mark.
Witnesses: W. Graham & GB van Wyk.
Before me, J.S. Moffat.
Assistant Commissioner.

Moffat had successfully used fears of Boer invasion to invite British protection. However Rhodes needed more than this if he was to achieve his ambitions of a Royal Charter. He needed a concession of mineral rights, and so before the year was out he sent another agent, Charles Daniel Rudd, to persuade Lobengula to sign away his country.

Also Read: Outrage over tribalist ‘Chabengula’ cartoon

Rudd assured Lobengula that no more than ten white men would mine in Matabeleland, but this was left out of the document Lobengula signed. As part of this agreement, and at the insistence of the British, neither the Boer or Portuguese were permitted to settle or gain concessions in the region. The 25-year Rudd Concession as the agreement became known, was signed by Lobengula on 30th October 1888.

He was soon to discover, however, that he had been tricked into signing a document that contained few of the assurances promised to him during the negotiations and although he dispatched envoys to England to intercede with Queen Victoria, by then it was too late. The treaty would lead to the annexation of his country.

Conflict with the Company

Lobengula tried to avoid direct conflict with the Company at every turn, and the uneasy relationship the white settlers in Mashonaland continued for several years. The king was angered by the lack of respect he perceived from Company officials and their demands that he stop his raids on Mashona villages.

“Lobengula did not want war; he had made that plain in a dozen ways which must have been painful to his pride, and possibly risky to his tenure as monarch. But from the beginning… Rhodes had determined to destroy the Matabeles and take over the entire country. In 1891, he promised a group of prospective settlers, ‘As soon as they interfere with our rights, I shall end their game, and when it is all over, I shall grant farms to those who assisted me.’”

The inevitable confrontation with the Chartered Company came to a head in 1893. In July 1893 Lobengula sent to Mashonaland a Matabele impi to enforce his authority in a dispute with a local chief.

“Matabele warriors ordered to teach their slaves a lesson do not travel on tiptoe. The impi which arrived at the gates of Fort Victoria on July 9th left behind a trail of smouldering huts, women ripped and impaled, and men and children roasted alive like meat.”

Arriving at Fort Victoria, the Matabele demanded that the rebellious local chief be handed over to his men. In response they were ordered to disperse by Dr (later Sir) Leander Starr Jameson, the Company’s Administrator in Mashonaland and close personal friend of Rhodes, who saw an opportunity to engineer an end-game in the Company’s struggle with Lobengula.

“Manyao, the Matabele chief, requested that the culprits be turned over to him, pointing out in a calm voice that Mashonaland was still a province of the Matabele kingdom, that Lobengula had never ceded governing rights, and that these rights included the settlement of disputes and the appointment or removal of Mashona chiefs. Under these rights, he asked Jameson for permission to carry out his order…

“Jameson was not prepared for legal niceties. The Matabeles were told to clear out, and warned that they would be fired upon if they were not out of the country by a certain time.” (Strage, 1973)

Dr Jameson was as good as his word, sending out a troop of men to rout the Matabele, and setting the Company on a collision course with Lobengula. Jameson immediately started planning the formation of an armed column, using the excuse of murdered Mashona villagers to finally bring Lobengula to account.

Whilst Jameson and the Company prepared for war, Lobengula was attempting to negotiate for peace, sending representatives to the British High Commissioner in the Cape with a letter addressed to the ‘Great White Queen’ pleading his position. The indunas were received at the Cape but persuaded to return, the letter unsent.

After a series of incidents and two major battles, in which the Matabele suffered huge losses (thousands of warriors falling victim to the Maxim gun), Lobengula was driven from his capital, Bulawayo, in early November 1893. The Royal kraal was burnt to the ground on his orders as he departed, and the last Matabele King disappeared into legend (he is believed to have died from ill health in January 1894).

“Did you ever see a chameleon catch a fly? The chameleon gets behind the fly and remains motionless for some time, then he advances very slowly and gently, first putting forward one leg and then the other. At last, when well within reach, he darts his tongue and the fly disappears. England is the chameleon and I am that fly.” (Keppel-Jones, 1983)

With methodical, and ruthless, efficiency Dr Jameson had cleared away the Company’s last obstacle to its claims over Matabeleland and Mashonaland. The circumstances surrounding the Matabele War caused much criticism in England, but the British Government, unwilling to bear either the responsibility or expense, accepted the Chartered Company’s ‘right by conquest’ to govern the territory.

Rhodes had succeeded in capturing a Kingdom, if not its King. Rhodesia was officially named after him in May 1895, a reflection of his popularity as the territory had already become widely known as ‘Zambesia.’ The less appealing ‘Charterland’ had also been in use whilst the British South Africa Company was consolidating its control over the vast region of central southern Africa. He is quoted to have said to a close friend: “To have a bit of country named after one is one of the things a man might be proud of” (Rotberg, 1990).

The territory north of the Zambezi was originally divided into North-Western and North-Eastern Rhodesia, before being amalgamated to form Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) in 1911. The name of Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) was officially adopted in 1898 for the territory south of the Zambezi (Northern Rhodesia Journal, January 1956).

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